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This Initiative is to be welcomed if only for opening up the debate and 
prompting the discussion here – which I have found most instructive. This 
is an important issue that - with certain honourable exceptions, among them 
the earlier participants in this useful dialogue - has hitherto not received 
much academic or political attention, yet resonates with many EU citizens. 
To give just one anecdotal example, last year UCL conducted two focus 
groups among EU citizens from other member states resident in London and 
the issue of national voting rights proved to be of far more concern to them 
than votes for the European Parliament. Though not a scientific survey, it 
expresses in certain respects a key feature of the very idea of Union citizen-
ship which, as a political scientist, I find can be lost in the predominantly 
legal analysis of this topic: namely, the reliance of citizenship rights, includ-
ing those associated with Union citizenship, on politics in general and the 
state – in this case the member states – in particular. It is this political con-
text that makes voting rights such an essential part of citizenship, yet one, 
given the complexities and peculiarities of the EU’s political system, that 
raises a number of difficulties in the European context.
There is a growing tendency to see citizenship as simply the artefact of 
legal rights. This trend is especially prevalent in accounts of Union citizen-
ship, where the key actor has been the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) and the majority of analyses come from legal scholars. Yet, 
any legal system has to be understood within the context of the wider politi-
cal system of which it forms a part and on which it ultimately depends. Not 
only are laws both the product of and administered and made reality through 
political processes, but also courts belong to that political apparatus and are 
themselves political actors, whose mode of adjudication and the degree to 
which their judgements will be followed reflect the character and capacity of 
the political institutions within which they are embedded. To the extent that 
we wish the law and those responsible for its administration to have  essential 
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democratic qualities – not least in treating all subject to them as political 
equals, whose interests deserve to be given equal consideration, with the 
laws applying equally to all –it is important that the law and the rights it 
embodies should be part and parcel of a democratic polity. It is for this 
reason that political rights are the defining attribute of citizenship. They 
form the ‘right of rights’ since they provide the means whereby citizens can 
ultimately enact and uphold – both directly and indirectly – all their other 
rights and assure they have the democratic virtues of showing them equal 
concern and respect with other citizens. In sum, the very features associated 
with the rule of law arise from the process of democratization and its accom-
panying effects on the legal system. It will be objected that rights serve as 
constraints on democracy and ‘majority tyranny’. However, this slogan 
proves empirically mistaken and overlooks the obvious fact that the main 
danger to rights comes from minority rule. Democracy has been instrumen-
tally promotive of rights precisely because it obliges rulers to be responsive 
to as many of the ruled as possible. In so doing, it forces politicians to appeal 
as far as possible to interests and ideals that are equally and widely shared 
rather than simply to the narrow sectional interests and ideals of privileged 
minorities. At the same time, the democratic process engages citizens in 
reciprocal relations with each other. By endorsing the public polices needed 
to promote rights –such as a criminal and penal system, health care, schools, 
pensions, social security and so on – they also sign up to the correlative 
duties needed to sustain these policies, such as paying taxes.
This argument might seem to lead inexorably to support for the Initiative. 
Yet, that moves too fast. For, as I noted, the EU political system is notori-
ously complex and renders the relationship between citizenship and political 
rights more complicated as a result. European citizenship is accessed through 
national citizenship which, as the Treaty notes, it is designed to be ‘addi-
tional to’ rather than to ‘replace’. This position is consistent with the EU’s 
declared ambition to promote ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe’ rather than to create a ‘European people’. Accordingly, Union citi-
zenship does not so much create access to EU level goods and services as 
ensure that its possessors are not discriminated against on grounds of nation-
ality when they move to another member state. So conceived, Union citizen-
ship serves to promote mutual respect between the citizens of the different 
member states by making them all potential citizens or dual citizens of 
all the other member states should they move to any one of them, at least so 
far as the four freedoms that are central to the EU are concerned. However, 
for this mutual respect to operate, it is important that Union citizenship 
does not undermine the democratic systems of the member states on which 
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it is parasitic, and which are needed to deliver those rights agreed upon 
between them at the EU level. Moreover, two of the main channels of political 
representation within the EU’s own political system – namely, national par-
liaments and the European Council – are explicitly based on member state 
citizenship, while even the supposedly direct channel of the European 
Parliament is based on constituencies designed to give adequate representa-
tion to each member state, with elections largely reflecting domestic con-
cerns. So it is important that citizens should be represented through these 
channels, but not be doubly represented and only to the extent they can 
commit their representatives to pursuing sustainable policies that show 
equal recognition to the peoples of Europe.
Two concerns need to be addressed as a result of this multilevel arrange-
ment, therefore, when considering the acquisition of national voting rights 
in another member state. It must be consistent with:
 1). those exercising these rights regarding the national laws as applying 
equally to all and undertaking the reciprocal obligations needed to sus-
tain the public policies on which the continued enjoyment of rights by 
all citizens within the member state depend, and
 2). the mutual recognition of the citizenship regimes of all member states 
and their consequent equal representation within the EU’s political 
system.
David Owen’s fifth option in his contribution more or less meets these 
conditions, if read alongside the caveats noted by Rainer Bauböck in his 
intervention. Thus, all ‘second country nationals’ (SCNs) should have a fair 
opportunity of acquiring nationality and hence voting rights in another 
member state after a minimal period of residence, while all SCNs who do 
not have nationality in their member state of residence should be eligible to 
vote in national elections of their member state of nationality. Meanwhile, 
though dual citizenship should be possible, its holders should only be able 
to exercise national voting rights in one country. This formula does con-
strain to some degree member state autonomy over citizenship rules, but 
only to a minimal degree in ways that in many respects preserve its integrity. 
On the one hand, it seeks to ensure that those who do vote in national elec-
tions are committed to the obligations needed to promote rights equally for 
all, on the other hand it ensures that there is no double voting for elections 
that impact on EU policies, so that all are treated equally. It might be argued 
that naturalisation should not be necessary. Certainly, I can see a case for 
those within the European sphere to be exempted from citizenship tests, 
with naturalisation automatic should they so choose. But the choice needs to 
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be a considered one that involves a commitment to the long term interests of 
the polity if voters are not to engage in rent seeking or free-riding behaviour 
of a kind that would undermine rights.
In remarking that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental 
status of nationals of the member states’ the CJEU has made it sound as 
if this new legal status represents the ‘right of rights’, and at least one 
contributor to this debate – Dimity Kochenov – has read it in this way. But 
this judicial hyperbole ignores the extent to which these very rights rest on 
the underlying obligations that follow from the exercise of democratic 
citizenship within the member states. As such, national citizenship necessarily 
continues to provide the fundamental status of Union citizens. However, as 
the Court’s rhetorical formula continues, Union citizenship does have a key 
role in ‘enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy 
the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to the 
exceptions as are expressly provided for.’ What I have suggested above is 
that the ‘same treatment’ must respect reciprocity between citizens within 
and between the member states, and that the proposed limits on access to 
and the exercise of national voting rights are among those exceptions that 
should be ‘expressly provided for’ within a political organisation committed 
to the ‘ever closer Union of (democratic) peoples’. As such, the Initiative 
raises a key issue but proposes a misguided solution, at odds with the very 
nature of the EU.
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